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This article analyzes a unique district-level data set to demonstrate that mineral
abundance increased the probably of Maoist insurgency in India over the past three
decades. Nevertheless, we show that this finding must be qualified in two respects.
First, mineral abundance has a much stronger effect on the probability of insurgency
after the liberalization of the mining sector in the mid-1990s, which precipitated the
rapid expansion of mining and related activities. Second, mineral abundance has a
much stronger effect on the probability of insurgency in the central Indian tribal belt,
where communities have strong symbolic and material links with nature. Our analysis
contributes to the broader debate on resource conflicts—which is largely informed by
cross-national statistical analyses. It suggests that abundant natural resources do not
mechanically increase the probability of insurgency. Rather, economic policy and
social structure play a crucial but overlooked role in mediating this relationship.
Keywords civil war, India, liberalization, Maoist insurgency, minerals, mining,
naxalites, resource conflict, resource curse, tribal belt
It is widely argued that natural resource abundance increases the likelihood that a
country will experience negative economic, political, and social outcomes (see Rosser
2006). One of the main resource curse subliteratures concerns whether or not there is
a relationship between natural resource abundance and civil war (see Ross 2004a;
2004b; McNeish 2010). The vast majority of research on this question is based on
cross-national statistical analysis, and pays little or no attention to the possible
mediating role of social and political variables (le Billon 2001; Rosser 2006). This
article contributes to the debate on natural resource conflict by concentrating on
one conflict in one country: the Maoist or ‘‘Naxalite’’ insurgency in India.
Orthodox economists see the liberalization of the Indian economy, which began
in the early 1990s, as a resounding success (e.g., Wilson and Purushothaman 2003).
During the same period, Maoist insurgents became an increasingly strong political
force in parts of India.
1 The Maoist Communist Centre and People’s War Group
were the most important insurgent organizations until they unified to form the
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 Communist Party of India (Maoist) in 2004. The insurgent leaders tend to be
ideologically enthused, middle-class, upper-caste men whose stated aim is to capture
state power through protracted guerrilla war (see Kennedy and Purushotham 2012).
In the 1980s the insurgents found mass support among lower-caste landless laborers
on the plains of Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. Since the 1990s, insurgent activity has
expanded dramatically in mineral-rich areas of central and eastern India that
are inhabited by tribal communities—most notably the states of Chhattisgarh,
Jharkhand, and Odisha (Kennedy and King 2013). According to the Ministry of
Home Affairs, the insurgents currently control 40,000km
2 of territory—an area
similar in size to Switzerland (Times of India 2009)—and former Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh describes the insurgency as ‘‘the single biggest internal-security
challenge ever faced by our country’’ (quoted in Kennedy 2013, 2).
This article uses a unique district-level data set to investigate the relationship
between mineral abundance and the Maoist insurgency.
2 To the best of our knowl-
edge only one other study uses a similar strategy. Its findings are inconclusive:
‘‘Mining activity under some conditions increases the likelihood and intensity of
conflict’’—most notably when they control for untouchables and tribal communities
(Hoelscher et al. 2012, 143). We analyze a data set that covers a longer period of
time—1982–2011, compared to 2004–2010—and a larger area—all 18 major states
of India, compared to the 6 states most affected by insurgency—to address three
questions: What is the relationship between the abundance of minerals and Maoist
insurgent activity in India? Did the relationship change after the liberalization of the
mining sector in the 1990s? And was this relationship different in the central Indian
tribal belt, where tribal communities have particularly strong symbolic and material
links with nature?
Understanding the Connection between Minerals and Insurgency
The Resource Curse and Internal Conflict
Until the 1980s, orthodox economists saw natural resource abundance as beneficial
for development (e.g., Balassa 1980; Krueger 1980). But since then it has been widely
argued that ‘‘natural resource abundance (or at least an abundance of particular
types of natural resources) increases the likelihood that countries will experience
negative economic, political and social outcomes including poor economic perfor-
mance, low levels of democracy, and civil war’’ (Rosser 2006, 7).
Over the past two decades there has been a proliferation in research that
analyzes cross-national data sets to investigate the relationship between natural
resources and internal conflict. Several influential studies have concluded that natu-
ral resource abundance—operationalized as the ratio of primary exports or a specific
natural resource to gross domestic product (GDP), or the presence of a particular
natural resource—is a strong and significant determinant of civil war onset (Collier
and Hoeffler 1998; 2004; 2005; Reynal-Querol 2002; Lujala 2010). However, other
studies have refuted this connection or qualified the link between natural resource
abundance and internal conflict (see Ross 2004a, 2004b, 2006; Hegre and Sambanis
2006; McNeish 2010). Broadly speaking, the causal mechanisms that link natural
resource abundance and internal conflict in cross-national statistical studies are
rationalist. Natural resources provide insurgents with economic incentives and
opportunities: They are motivated by the desire to either enrich themselves or to
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 generate the resources necessary to undertake guerrilla warfare—that is, buy arms or
pay the rank and file. In addition, because insurgents are assumed to be rational
actors, they are most likely to operate in areas where there is little risk of being sanc-
tioned by the state—and it is widely argued that abundant natural resources provide
easily accruable rents that sustain weak political structures (see Rosser 2006).
To some extent the rationalist explanation helps us understand the motivations
of Maoist insurgents in India. It is estimated that they generate between 15 and 20
billion rupees ($300–$400 million) per year, primarily by extorting money from econ-
omic actors ranging from forest produce traders to large mining companies (Times of
India 2009; Satapathy et al. 2010). The largest source of income is the mining indus-
try. India is the third largest producer of coal in the world, and the fourth largest
producer of bauxite and iron ore (Indian Bureau of Mining 2012). Large quantities
of these minerals are extracted and processed in areas of central and eastern India
that are under insurgent control—and the insurgents have the capacity to severely
disrupt these operations. A senior official working for the (state-owned) National
Mineral Development Corporation claimed that in 2009 the Bailadila iron ore mines
in Dantewara, Chhattisgarh, lost 4.8 billion rupees ($96 million) as a result of Maoist
interference, which included attacks on railway tracks and trains, and bandhs
(general strikes) (Ghosh 2010). With the Indian state unable to guarantee their secur-
ity, many corporations cut deals with the insurgents. In 2005 ESSAR (an Indian con-
glomerate) opened a 267-km pipeline to transport iron ore slurry from Dantewara,
through Maoist-dominated areas, to the port of Vishakhapatnam in neighboring
Andhra Pradesh. The pipeline was subject to a number of attacks, and Vishwa
Ranjan, who served as Chhattisgarh’s Director General of Police from 2007 to
2011, recalls that ‘‘the company’s security officer suggested we raise a battalion that
they would fund’’ (Sharma 2011). Ranjan ‘‘turned down the suggestion because a
force cannot be raised for a private company’’ (Sharma 2011). Instead, ESSAR
agreed to pay protection money to the insurgents in order to guarantee the security
of their operations, halting the attacks.
3 The story is similar for smaller scale illegal
mining activities, which are widespread in central and eastern India. For example, an
illicit mine owner from Jharkhand agreed to pay the insurgents 5% of his $4 million
annual revenue after they kidnapped him at gunpoint. He told Miklian and Carney
(2010) that ‘‘most of the mines in this state are in the forests, so we are easy targets
[for the insurgents]...The only way to stop the attacks is to negotiate.’’
4
There is a second explanation for the link between natural resource abundance
and insurgency: The extraction of natural resources entails land expropriation, dis-
placement, and environmental degradation, which is often accompanied by coercion
and insufficient compensation, and this encourages the affected population to side
with antistate, anticapitalist insurgents. This causal mechanism is largely ignored
by cross-national statistical analyses, but finds strong support among anthropolo-
gists and human geographers—as well as journalists and activists—who undertake
research on the ground. McNeish (2010, 3) notes: ‘‘Over the last decade and a half
there has been a dramatic growth in mining activity and connected violent protest in
many countries in the global south.’’ This is perhaps most notable in Latin America,
where the recent expansion of natural resource extraction has had disastrous
consequences for local populations, resulting in resistance and, in some cases, violent
conflict (Bebbington 2009; Arellano-Yanguas 2011).
Again, the Indian case provides a fair amount of evidence to support this argu-
ment. As Miklian and Carney (2010) note, abundant mineral resources have ‘‘been
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 managed so disastrously that many locals—uprooted, unemployed, and living in a
toxic and dangerous environment, due to the mining operations—have thrown in
their lot with the Maoists.’’ Since 1951, 3 million people have been displaced as a
result of mining and mining-related projects in India and the livelihoods of many
more people have been destroyed (Padel and Das 2010, 55). The vast majority of
these people receive little or no compensation, and they have very few possibilities
to peacefully object to these developments. Consequently, they are open to the
influence of the Maoist insurgents, who have an appealing antistate, anticapitalist
ideology and provide an organizational framework that is powerful enough to
challenge the power of the state and the mining companies—at least at the local
level (Kujur 2006; Miklian and Carney 2010; Navlahka and Myrdal 2010; Roy
2010; Kennedy and King 2013). For example, Arundhati Roy (2010) notes how Tata
cooperated with local politicians and police to repress dissent and coerce the
population into consenting to a steel plant in Lohandiguda, southern Chhattisgarh.
The insurgents moved into the area in order to help the local population resist
the development ‘‘after graffiti had begun to appear on the walls of village houses,
saying, Naxali aao, hamein bachao [Naxals come and save us]!’’ (Roy 2010).
Social and Political Variables
The accounts just set out help us understand why some areas are affected by insur-
gent activity whereas others are not. They have, however, been criticized for explain-
ing insurgent activity ‘‘solely in terms of the size and nature of countries’ natural
resource endowments’’ when ‘‘a consensus is emerging that various political and
social variables mediate the relationship’’ (Rosser 2006, 3). To understand the role
played by political and social variables, we must appreciate the manner in which
natural resources are politically and socially constructed (le Billon 2001). The trans-
formation of nature into commodities is a highly politicized process that involves,
among other things, the definition of property rights and the allocation of profits.
The risk that this involves violence is strongly influenced by ‘‘the pattern of social
relations, as well as the quality and democracy or legitimacy of institutions’’ (le
Billon 2001, 568). It seems apparent that an abundance of natural resources is not
a sufficient condition for insurgency: Given favorable social and political conditions,
natural resources can be used for peaceful development—as in Norway or Botswana.
We next explore how economic policy and social structure mediate the relationship
between minerals abundance and Maoist insurgent activity in India.
The Liberalization of the Mining Sector
The greatest change in economic policy in the history of independent India was the
liberalization of the economy that began in the early 1990s. From 1947 onward,
India’s economic strategy placed a strong emphasis on centralized planning, protec-
tionism, import substitution, a large public sector, and strong regulation of private
business (Bhaduri and Nayyar 1996). This changed rapidly and dramatically in
response to a balance of payments crisis in 1990–1991 and the World Bank’s sub-
sequent structural adjustment program. The liberalization of the Indian economy
has been implemented with increasing scope and intensity ever since.
This shift in economic policy is apparent in the mining sector. From indepen-
dence in 1947 to the early 1990s, mining operations were controlled by Public Sector
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 Undertakings and foreign ownership was limited to 40%. Moreover, the Indian
state’s policy toward mineral exploitation was conservative. For example, the second
Planning Commission report viewed mineral resources as ‘‘wasting assets: once they
are taken out of the ground and utilised they are lost forever’’ (quoted in Padel and
Das 2010, 191). The liberalization of the Indian economy that began in the early
1990s and in particular the new National Mineral Policy (Government of India
1993) extended the rights of both private domestic and foreign companies to partici-
pate in the mining sector, exploit minerals, and expatriate profits. Since then the lib-
eralization of the mining sector has continued to gather pace. In 2008 a new National
Mineral Policy was passed and a Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation)
Act was introduced in 2012 (Government of India 2008; 2012). This legislation is
designed to make it easier for corporations to extract mineral resources and more
difficult for objectors to hold up the process (Government of India 2008; 2012).
The assumption underlying this policy shift is that mineral reserves must be extracted
quickly for the benefit of society. P. Chidambaram, the former Union Minister of
Finance,
5 remarked: ‘‘Mineral wealth is wealth that must be harvested and used
for the people’’ (Chaudhury 2009) and ‘‘Of what use are minerals, if they cannot
be...mined and used for producing value-added goods and they remain buried in
mother earth for the next million years?’’ (Dholabhai 2012).
6
Liberalization has brought about a proliferation of mining activities in rural
India—particularly since the turn of the century. As Arundhati Roy (2010) notes:
‘‘Over the past five years or so, the governments of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa
and West Bengal have signed hundreds of MoUs [memoranda of understanding]
with corporate houses, worth several billion dollars, all of them secret, for steel
plants, sponge-iron factories, power plants, aluminium refineries, dams and mines.’’
Communist Party of India (Maoist) General Secretary Ganapathy argues that the
intention of the Indian state, in alliance with ‘‘corporate comprador big business
houses,’’ is ‘‘to drain the rich mineral and forest wealth’’ (Communist Party of Nepal
(Maoist) 2007, 72). A pamphlet produced by the Dandakaranya Special Zonal
Committee went further, stating, ‘‘It is against this violence that we have been com-
pelled to answer with ‘violence.’ Had we not resisted, they would have succeeded in
their objective’’ (quoted in Navlakha and Myrdal 2010).
Mining in the Central Indian Tribal Belt
Historically, the greatest social cleavage in India is between ‘‘heterogeneous, differ-
entiated and stratified’’ Hindu society that inhabited the plains, and ‘‘homogenous,
undifferentiated and unstratified’’ tribal communities that lived in hilly, forested
areas (Be ´teille 1986, 311; Xaxa 1999; Padel 2010). The 84 million people who are
classified as Scheduled Tribes belong to 698 separate communities that vary enor-
mously in terms of population size, geographic spread, mode of livelihood, social
organization, language, and customs (Government of India 2006). Despite their dif-
ferences, historically tribal communities had one thing in common: ‘‘They all stood
more or less outside Hindu civilization’’ (Be ´teille 1986, 316) or they ‘‘continued to be
distinct because they escaped colonisation and subjugation’’ (Xaxa 1999, 3593). In
practice, this meant that tribal communities tended to have strong material and
symbolic links to the natural world. The forests historically provided them with their
primary means of subsistence: They practiced shifting cultivation, hunted, and col-
lected forest produce for food, fuel, medicines, buildings materials, and alcohol, as
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 well as to exchange with traders from the plains for salt, cloth, and cash (Be ´teille
1986; Xaxa 1999; Sundar 2007; Padel 2010; Kennedy and King 2013). Over the past
two centuries the state gradually increased its control over tribal communities’
historic homelands and many tribal people have been alienated from their land.
Nevertheless, forest resources continue to play an important role in the tribal liveli-
hoods; for example, the Government of Chhattisgarh (2005, 204) estimates that in
Dantewara district 40% of tribal communities’ livelihood comes from the forest,
while 30% comes from agriculture, 15% from animal husbandry, and 15% from wage
labor. Moreover, tribal religions tend to worship the spirits of nature—the trees,
mountains, and streams in the areas that they live. One woman who had observed
the destruction of holy sites in her village and the surrounding area in order to make
way for Lanjigarh refinery in Orissa exclaimed to Padel and Das (2010, 365): ‘‘They
even destroyed our Gods.’’ Additionally, metals are thought to be sacred substances:
to rip up forests and mountains, to ruin springs, and to pollute streams and rivers, in
order to extract metals and sell them for profit, is seen as a particularly degenerate
act (Padel and Das, 2010). We would expect that because tribal communities tend
to have stronger material and symbolic attachment to the natural world, mining
activities will be more destructive to their lives and livelihoods, and therefore more
likely to lead to violent resistance and insurgency.
Furthermore, in tribal areas the state’s role as facilitator of mining activity takes
a form that is reminiscent of its colonial predecessor (Sundar 2007; Padel 2010;
Kennedy and King 2011). This is not just motivated by economic concerns—it is also
related to the view that tribal communities are ‘‘backward Hindus’’ who needed to
be forcefully developed into useful citizens (Sundar 2007; Padel 2010; Kennedy
and King 2011). Former Minister of Finance Chidambaram sums this view up:
‘‘Do you want the tribals to remain hunters and gatherers?’’ (Chaudhury 2009)
and ‘‘We are not building museums here, we are building a modern society,
a modern state’’ (Dholabhai 2012). The provisions of the Fifth Schedule of the Indian
Constitution (Government of India 1950), as well as later legislation such as
Panchayats (Extension to the Scheduled Areas) Act (Government of India 1996)
and Samatha judgment,
7 should protect tribal communities’ rights to their land. But
in practice, the spirit of this legislation is subverted and the state uses the colonial-era
Land Acquisition Act (Government of India 1894) to expropriate land for develop-
ment projects that are deemed to be ‘‘in the public interest’’ (Sundar 2007; Padel
and Das 2010; Kennedy and King 2011).
8 The state and mining companies use police
and goonda violence to suppress protests against these processes. For example, in
January 2006, in Kalinganagar in Jajpur, Orissa, police shot 12 tribal people protest-
ing because they were not adequately compensated for an iron ore mining and proces-
sing project being built by Tata Steel on their land (Padel and Das 2010). The brutality
of the neo-colonial state is perhaps most evident in Dantewara district, southern
Chhattisgarh. In 2005, as the state government signed memoranda of understanding
with Tata and ESSAR to build steel plants, Salwa Judum—a counterinsurgent militia
funded by the state and these mining companies—displaced a quarter of a million
tribal people in a process that was accompanied by murder, burning of houses,
looting, and sexual violence (Sundar 2007; Navlakha and Myrdal 2010; Roy 2010;
Kennedy and King 2011, 2013). Thus, Arundhati Roy (2010) argues:
If the tribals have taken up arms, they have done so because a govern-
ment which has given them nothing but violence and neglect now wants
154 J. Kennedy
D
o
w
n
l
o
a
d
e
d
 
b
y
 
[
U
n
i
v
e
r
s
i
t
y
 
C
o
l
l
e
g
e
 
L
o
n
d
o
n
]
 
a
t
 
0
3
:
3
4
 
1
9
 
M
a
y
 
2
0
1
5
 to snatch away the last thing they have—their land. Clearly, they do not
believe the government when it says it only wants to ‘‘develop’’ their
region...They believe that if they do not fight for their land, they will
be annihilated. That is why they have taken up arms.
Mechanism and Hypotheses
It is widely argued that mineral abundance increases the likelihood that an area will
be affected by insurgency. This is because mining activity provides insurgents with
opportunities to generate income and because mineral extraction negatively affects
local communities who then side with antistate, anticapitalist insurgents.
Hypothesis 1. The likelihood of an area being affected by Maoist
insurgent activity will be higher where there are abundant
mineral resources.
It is probable that political and social variables will mediate this relationship
between natural resource abundance and insurgency. We predict that mineral abun-
dance is more likely to lead to insurgency after liberalization of the mining sector.
Liberalization opened mining to private and foreign companies, and closed many
of the peaceful channels through which objectors could hold up mining projects.
Consequently, it brought about a rapid expansion of mining and related activities
in rural areas. This increased insurgents’ opportunities to generate resources. It also
increased the number of communities aggrieved by planned projects and projects—
at the same time as it was becoming increasingly difficult for communities to stop
projects through nonviolent means.
Hypothesis 2. The effect of abundant mineral resources on the likelihood
of Maoist insurgent activity will be stronger after the
liberalization of the mining sector.
Finally, we predict that tribal communities are more likely than lower caste
landless laborers to react to mining projects by siding with antistate, anticapitalist
insurgents. There are two reasons for this. First, tribal communities have strong
material and symbolic links with the natural world, and are, therefore, more nega-
tively affected by mining projects. Second, the state is more brutal in its treatment
of tribal communities who object to mining projects because they are viewed as
‘‘backward Hindus’’ who must be forcefully developed.
Hypothesis 3. The effect of abundant mineral resources on the likelihood
of Maoist insurgent activity will be stronger in areas that
are inhabited by tribal populations.
Models and Results
Research Plan
Broadly speaking, there are two main research strategies for studying insurgency. The
first concentrates on the national level and involves statistical analyses of cross-
national data sets. This is problematic because most internal conflicts occur in limited
Socioeconomic Determinants of Resource Conflict 155
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 parts of a country and can be best explained in terms of subnational characteristics
(Kalyvas 2006). For example, in cross-national analyses, natural resource abundance
is operationalized as the export value of natural resources or a specific resource type as
a proportion of total economic output or total exports, or the presence of a particular
natural resource. But insurgent activity is not necessarily located in the same part of a
country as the natural resources (Lujala 2010). The second strategy concentrates on
the local level and collects ethnographic data on one case or a small number of cases.
Such studies provide important insights into the nature of insurgency. But because
their spatial andtemporal scope is narrow and they necessarily select on the dependent
variable, there are obvious limitations to generalizing the findings.
This study concentrates on the interface between political actors and local popula-
tions (Kalyvas2006).Intheprevious sectionwe generatedhypothesesfromaclose read-
ing of narrowly focused studies that concentrate on the local level, and in the next
section we use a unique district-level data set to test the generalizability of these hypoth-
eses. Our strategy allows us to undertake an analysis that is systematic and broad in
scope, but that pays close attention to the specific context of this resource conflict.
We appreciate that in social reality there is a large extent of local variation regarding
the specific causes of insurgency. Nevertheless, our research plan allows us to identify
patterns and trends that might be overlookedby narrowly focused ethnographic studies.
To the best of our knowledge, only one other study uses a similar strategy to
investigate the relationship between mineral abundance and Maoist insurgency
activity (Hoelscher et al. 2012). Our analysis improves on this study in several
respects. First, the Hoelscher et al. (2012) sample is limited to six Indian states
that have been most affected by insurgent activity. It therefore limits its sample
by selecting on the dependent variable. Our sample includes all states regardless of
whether or not they have been affected by the insurgency—with the exception of
Jammu and Kashmir and the northeastern states that have experienced non-Maoist
insurgencies over the past three decades. It covers districts inhabited by 93.5% of the
Indian population, compared to just 27.9% in Hoelscher et al. (2012). Second, the
present wave of insurgent activity began in the early 1980s and the liberalization
of the mining sector began in the 1990s, but the Hoelscher et al. data set only covers
the period 2004 to 2010. Our data set covers the period 1982 to 2011, allowing us to
investigate how the effect of mineral abundance on insurgency has changed over time
and, in particular, the effect of the liberalization of the mining sector.
Variables
The dependent variable in our analysis is the onset of insurgent activity. We docu-
mented all fatalities in incidents involving Maoist insurgents that were reported in
The Times of India (Mumbai edition), India’s most widely read English-language
newspaper, between 1982 and 2011. There were 1,106 fatal incidents in this period,
resulting in 4,698 deaths. We operationalized the onset of insurgent activity in two
ways. First, we coded the first year in which there were more than the mean number
of conflicts deaths per decade (four) as 1; all further cases in which a district experi-
enced more than the threshold of conflict deaths are dropped; and all cases in which
there were fewer than the threshold of conflict deaths are coded as 0.
9 Seventy-two
out of 1,111 (11%) districts were affected by onset of insurgent activity.
Second, in order to test the hypothesis that the relationship between mineral
abundance and insurgency is different in areas that are predominantly inhabited
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 by tribal communities, we disaggregate the dependent variable. This method is firmly
established in cross-national analyses in which authors seek to test whether two,
rather than one, causal pathways explain civil war onset (Sambanis 2001; Buhaug
2006). We operationalize tribal areas as districts covered by the Fifth Schedule of
the Indian Constitution, legislation designed to protect tribal communities from being
dispossessed of their lands and natural resources in areas they have historically inhab-
ited (Government of Indian.d.).Nineteen percentofdistrictsin thesampleare located
in tribal areas. In this formulation the dependent variable is split into three categories:
0 for districts not affected by insurgent activity; 1 for onset of insurgency in districts
not covered by the Fifth Schedule (‘‘Hindu areas’’); and 2 for Fifth Schedule districts
that experience onset of insurgent activity (‘‘tribal areas’’). Forty-five (62.5%) affected
districts are in Hindu areas, whereas 27 (37.5%) are in tribal areas.
The key independent variable is the presence of ‘‘important’’ (i.e., commercially
viable) reserves of bauxite, coal, and iron ore deposits in a district, according to the
Indian Bureau of Mining (2011 and other years) Indian Minerals Yearbook. Three
hundred forty-seven out of 1,194 (29.1%) districts in the sample meet these criteria.
Hoeschler et al. (2012) use official revenues from iron ore and coal mining as their
dependent variable. We include bauxite because several qualitative studies suggest
that bauxite mining and processing is linked to insurgent activity (Kujur 2006; Padel
and Das 2010). Moreover, Hoeschler et al.’s (2012) use of official revenue data might
be problematic because—as one of the co-authors (Miklian and Carney 2010) notes
elsewhere—much of the mining activity in insurgent-affected areas is illegal (and
therefore not taxed by the state). What is more, as we note, state-mining company
coercion and violence that precede mining activity—rather than the mining activity
itself—are often an important source of conflict. Consequently, although a dummy
variable for whether or not there are commercially viable quantities of minerals is
less precise than mining revenue, it should more accurately capture the mechanisms
that link mineral abundance and insurgent activity.
We control for several other variables. First, we include the log-transformed
total district population because due to the way that insurgent activity is operationa-
lized, more populous districts are ceteris paribus more likely to be affected by insur-
gent activity (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Sambanis and
Hegre 2006). Second, we control for the level of development because it has been
argued that in less developed areas both state capacity and the opportunity cost
of rebellion are lower (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Sambanis
and Hegre 2006). Cross-national studies would tend to use per-capita GDP, but
because these data are not available at the district level we use literacy rates. Third,
because state power tends to be weaker in rural areas, insurgents are able to build up
base areas in the countryside without interference from the state (Fearon and Laitin
2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Hegre and Sambanis 2006; Kalyvas 2006). We
therefore control for the proportion of inhabitants that live in rural areas. The data
for these three variables come from the Census of India (Government of India 1981;
1991; 2001). Finally, we add a calendar year variable to capture possible changes in
the political climate over time.
10
Results
The results of our analysis are reported in Tables 1 and 2. As the census data we use
for independent variables are enumerated decennially, the temporal unit of our
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 analysis is decades. The 1981 data are used to explain the insurgent activity in the
period 1982 to 1991, and so on. The 1-year lag between independent and dependent
variables reduces endogeneity. As the dependent variable is binary we use logistic
regression. Table 1 shows the results of binomial logistic regressions in which dis-
tricts affected by insurgency are coded as 1 and all others are coded 0. We report
odds ratio, the exponentiated regression coefficient. In parentheses we specify robust
standard errors clustered by district to account for the nonindependence of observa-
tions from the same district. In Table 2, we report the results of binomial regressions,
as well as the multinomial logistic regression in which affected districts are divided
into those in Hindu areas—coded 1—and those in tribal areas—coded 2. In the
multinomial regressions we report relative risk ratio, the equivalent of odds ratio
for multinomial regression. Again, robust standard errors clustered by district are
in parentheses. The third column in the multinomial regression model gives the
probability that the estimates for the two alternative outcomes—that is, in tribal
and nontribal districts—are statistically different.
Model 1 provides strong evidence to support hypothesis 1: Throughout the
whole period, across the whole of India, districts that possess an abundance of
bauxite, coal or iron ore were 3.1 times more likely to affected by insurgent activity
that those that did not (p<.001).
Models 2 to 6 enable us to test hypothesis 2, which predicts that the effect of
mineral abundance on the likelihood of Maoist insurgent activity will be stronger
after the liberalization of the mining sector. Model 2 includes a pre-=post-1991
dummy variable, which is not significant. Model 3, which includes a pre-=post-2001
Table 1. Liberalization, mining, and insurgency: Binomial logistic regressions
showing odds of Maoist insurgency by district
1982–
2011
1982–
2011
1982–
2011
1982–
1991
1992–
2001
2002–
2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mineral abundance 3.084    2.921    3.139    2.151 2.228 6.392   
(.836) (.761) (.854) (.973) (1.107) (3.085)
Pre=post 1991 — 1.262 — — — —
(.347)
Pre=post 2001 — — 2.000  ———
(.662)
Total population 1.935  1.908  1.981  4.661    3.721 .963
(‘000, log) (.492) (.480) (.505) (1.873) (2.659) (.293)
Literacy, % .972  .980  .970  .936  .965  .978 
(.011) (.010) (.011) (.025) (.017) (.020)
Rural population, % 1.026 1.029 1.025 1.010 1.008 1.051 
(.016) (.016) (.015) (.019) (.028) (.025)
Year 1.034 — — — — —
(.020)
n 1,111 1,111 1,111 339 348 424
Note. Constants are calculated but not reported. Models 1 to 6 are binomial regressions that
report the odds of a district being affected by insurgent activity. Significant differences:
 p .05 (5%),   p .01 (1%),    p .001 (0.1%).
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 dummy variable, shows that districts are two times more likely to experience onset of
insurgency after 2001 (p¼.036). The effect size and significance of mineral abundance
remain unchanged. We then run regressions with limited samples: 1982–1991 in model
4, 1991–2001 in model 5, and 2002–2011 in model 6. For the periods 1982–1991 and
1991–2001, there is not a significant relationship between the presence of minerals and
insurgent activity—in both cases the odds ratio was just over 2 and the p value about
.100. There is, however, a significant relationship between the presence of minerals
and insurgent activity in the period 2002–2011: Districts with commercially viable
quantities of these minerals are 6.4 times more likely to experience insurgent activity
(p<.001). These results suggest that mineral abundance only becomes a significant
predictor of insurgent activity in the final decade of our analysis—by which time
the liberalization of the mining sector, which began in the early 1990s, had resulted
in the rapid expansion of mining and related activities.
Models 8 to 10 enable us to test hypothesis 3, which predicts that the effect of
mineral abundance on the likelihood of Maoist insurgent activity will be stronger
in areas that are inhabited by tribal populations. Model 8 includes a dummy variable
for whether or not a district is covered by the Fifth Schedule of the Indian Consti-
tution. It shows that districts with a significant tribal population are more than twice
as likely to be affected by insurgent activity as those that are not (p¼.002). The
Table 2. Social structure, mining, and insurgency: Binomial and multinomial
logistic regressions showing odds of Maoist insurgency by district
Binomial Multinomial
All India Hindu Tribal p(bH 6¼ bT)
(7) (8) (9) (10)
Mineral abundance 3.084    2.490    2.529    1.543 10.903    <.001
(.836) (.657) (.670) (.516) (5.274)
Tribal district — 2.368   2.368   —— —
(.678) (.678)
Pre=post 2001 — — 1.971  —— —
(.663)
Total population 1.935  2.074   2.126   2.496   1.199 .171
(‘000, log) (.492) (.534) (.541) (.764) (.528)
Literacy, % .972  .975  .973  .980 .958  .300
(.011) (.011) (.012) (.012) (.019)
Rural population, % 1.026 1.023 1.022 1.035 1.009 .337
(.016) (.015) (.015) (.022) (.018)
Year 1.034 1.033 — 1.021 1.054 .362
(.020) (.020) — (.025) (.030)
n 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,111
Note. Constants are calculated but not reported. Models 7 to 9 are binomial regressions that
report the odds of a district being affected by insurgent activity. Model 10 is a multinomial
regression in which the dependent variable is bifurcated into insurgent affected districts where
the social structure is typical, respectively, of Hindu and Tribal society. The third column gives
the probability that the variable estimates for the two alternative outcomes are statistically
different. Signficant differences:  p .05 (5%),   p .01 (1%),    p .001 (0.1%).
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 effect size of mineral abundance falls slightly, from 3.1 to 2.5, but remains significant
at p¼.001. In model 9, when we include both the tribal belt and the pre-=post-2001
dummies, the effect size and significance of both variables, as well as mineral
abundance, remain largely unaffected. Model 10, the multinomial regression model,
shows that there is not a significant relationship between commercially viable quan-
tities of bauxite, coal, or iron ore and insurgent activity in Hindu districts. But dis-
tricts in the tribal belt with abundant quantities of these minerals are 10.9 times more
likely to be affected by insurgent activity (p<.001). The third column in model 10
demonstrates that the relationship between minerals and insurgency is statistically
different on the plains compared to in the tribal belt (p<.001). This is because tribal
communities have strong material and symbolic links with the natural world, and
because they experience the most brutal side of the Indian state, which views them
as ‘‘backward Hindus’’ who need to be forcefully developed into useful citizens.
We performed a series of robustness checks. We reran the regressions using
alternative specifications of the dependent variable, adding state dummy variables
and removing influential cases.
11 The results increase our confidence the findings.
Conclusions
This article investigated the effect of commercially viable mineral resources on the
Maoist or ‘‘Naxalite’’ insurgency in India. We analyzed a unique district-level data
set covering the period 1982–2011 to investigate the manner in which the relationship
between mineral abundance and insurgency is affected by changes in economic policy
over time and variations in social structure across space. Throughout the whole
period, across the whole of India, districts with important reserves of bauxite, coal,
or iron ore were three times more likely to experience the onset of insurgent activity.
This supports the resource curse thesis—that is, the argument that mineral abundance
is likely to lead to negative economic, political, and social outcomes, such as civil war.
Nevertheless, we demonstrate that this finding must be qualified in two respects.
First, the relationship between the abundance of bauxite, coal, or iron ore and
insurgency was strongly influenced by the state’s economic policy—in this case the
liberalization of the mining sector that began in the mid 1990s. This is because
liberalization precipitated the rapid expansion of mining and related activities, which
in turn resulted in more opportunities for the insurgents to generate income
to sustain their activities, as well more displacement and pollution, and therefore
more discontented local communities willing to support the insurgents.
Second, the relationship between mineral abundance and insurgency was
affected by social structure: Mineral abundance was only a significant predictor
of insurgency in areas with a tribal social structure. This is because tribal communi-
ties have strong material and symbolic links to nature whereas lower caste landless
laborers on the plains do not. The negative effects of mining—displacement and
pollution—are, therefore, far more destructive on tribal communities, making them
more prone to support the antistate, anticapitalist insurgents. Moreover, because
the state sees tribal communities as ‘‘backward Hindus’’ who need to be forcefully
developed into useful citizens, it treats them in a particularly brutal manner and it
is likely that this increases the likelihood of violent conflict.
Thus, we show that in certain circumstances mineral abundance significantly
increases the likelihood that a district is affected by insurgent activity, and that var-
iations in economic policy and social structure are crucial to understanding this
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 relationship. This provides support for Rosser’s (2006) argument that dominant the-
ories for explaining the link between natural resource abundance and insurgency—
either rationalist accounts that stress the income generating opportunities or those
that stress the negative effects of mining on the local population—are too simplistic.
The presence of abundant natural resources does not mechanically increase the
probability of an area being affected by insurgent activity. In Norway or Botswana,
for example, natural resources have been used to encourage peaceful development.
Rather, the presence of abundant natural resources increases the probability of an
area being affected by insurgent activity in certain circumstances: first, when econ-
omic policy—such as the liberalization of the mining in India that began in the
1990s—leads to increased mining activity; and second, when a community’s social
structure makes the community particularly prone to the negative effects of mining
activity—as for tribal communities, for example, who have particularly strong
material and symbolic links to the natural world.
Precisely because our study demonstrates the importance of economic policy on
insurgent activity, it has important policy implications. India’s mining policy is not
static: The liberalization of the mining sector—which makes it easier for corpora-
tions to extract minerals and more difficult for the local populations to peacefully
object—is an ongoing and intensifying process (Padel and Das 2010). Supporters
of this policy argue that the acceleration in mineral extraction will increase GDP
and that this will benefit the whole of society: ‘‘Mineral wealth is wealth that must
be harvested and used for the people,’’ as former Finance Minister Chidambaram
puts it. But many people do not share this enthusiasm for the large-scale extraction
of minerals, and it has led to violent resistance from local populations—especially in
tribal areas. These communities, whose modes of livelihood are based on long-term
coexistence with nature, are decimated by the Indian state’s myopic economic
strategy, which is predicated on the extraction and consumption of unsustainable
quantities of resources. At the moment many tribal communities support Maoist
insurgents because of their antistate and anticapitalist stance. The insurgents provide
tribal communities with powerful allies that are capable of challenging the power of
the state and mining companies at the local level in a way that more localized and
disparate forms of antimining contentious politics in Latin America, for example,
are not (Bebbington 2009; Arellano-Yanguas 2011). Nevertheless, it is not clear that
this relationship is beneficial to tribal communities, because it allows the state and
mining companies to portray all opposition as Maoist in order to legitimize its bel-
licose counterinsurgent strategy (Miklian and Carney 2010; Navlakha and Myrdal
2010; Roy 2010; Kennedy and Purushotham 2012; Kennedy and King 2013). It is
widely argued that this strategy is not designed just to defeat the Maoist insurgents,
but also to force their tribal supporters off their mineral-rich land in order create, in
the words of former Prime Minister Singh (2007), an atmosphere that is ‘‘conducive
to investment’’ and ‘‘rapid economic development.’’ Consequently, tribal communi-
ties’ support for the Maoist insurgents may not have the desired effect of halting
mining activities. Tragically, it might have the unintended consequence of facilitating
the extraction of mineral resources.
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 Notes
1. The first wave of Maoist insurgency occurred between 1946 and 1951; the second wave
was from 1967 until the early 1970s; and the third wave began in the early 1980s (Kennedy
and Purushotham 2012).
2. The district is the administrative division below the state and the smallest unit of analysis
for which all the data are available.
3. This was common knowledge in the local area and was confirmed in U.S. diplomatic
cables released by wikileaks (Times of India 2011).
4. Mining companies are not merely a source of cash for the insurgents. They are also
a source of explosives—a resource that is crucial for the insurgents’ strategy, which involves
the heavy use of landmines. For example, in June 2009 the insurgents attacked the India’s
biggest bauxite mine, run by Nalco in Panchpat Mali, Koraput, Orissa, killed 10 police
officers, and looted large amounts of explosives and detonators (The Hindu 2009).
5. Chidambaram is a former corporate lawyer who represented several mining companies,
as well as a former director of Vedanta.
6. India has trillions of dollars of bauxite, coal, and iron ore reserves—several times its
annual gross domestic product (Padel and Das 2010; Roy 2010). Nevertheless, the logical
flaw in these statements is apparent when one considers that the state receives only rela-
tively small royalties from mineral extraction—for example, between 10 and 50 rupees per
metric tonne of iron ore, depending on quality, compared to the international price of up
to 7,000 rupees (Navlakha and Myrdal 2010).
7. Samatha v. State of Andhra Pradesh, Supreme Court of India (July 11, 1997).
8. The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation
and Resettlement Act (Government of India 2013) recently replaced the Land Acquisition
Act (Government of India 1894).
9. This is preferable to civil war incidence—coding 1 for cases with more than the threshold
of conflict deaths and 0 for those with fewer—where the estimated coefficients are
complicated averages of the effect of a covariate on both the onset and the duration of
civil conflicts (Fearon 2010).
10. For descriptive statistics and correlation matrix see the online appendix: https://ucl.
academia.edu/JonathanKennedy/appendices.
11. The robustness checks are documented in more detail in the online appendix. See note 10.
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